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NOTES AND COMMENTS
and S. The question arises as to whether or not S's lien for furnishing
materials can defeat O's homestead exemption.
The North Carolina Constitution4 5 provides that the mechanic's and
laborer's liens can defeat the homestead exemption; whereas, the ma-
terialman's lien being purely statutory cannot.46 C's lien is a mechanic's
lien and by express provision can defeat the homestead. S's lien is a
materialman's lien and being purely statutory cannot as such defeat the
homestead exemption. If S's lien is not allowed to defeat the homestead
exemption and C's lien is, S has lost his only security. This would
seem contrary to the established policy of protecting the rights of the
subcontractor as against the principal contractor. If, however, S's ma-
terialman's lien is substituted to the rights of C's mechanic's lien and
thus allowed to -defeat the homestead exemption, this would be promot-
ing a materialman's lien to the elevated status of a mechanic's lien in
law, though not in fact. Though this result may be desirable as pro-
tection for the subcontractor, it certainly should not be attained by
giving liens purely statutory the power to defeat rights conferred by the
Constitution.
A satisfactory solution of these problems under the existing lien law
is not apparent. 47 However, in the light of the possible confusion that
application of the existing lien law might produce, a constitutional
amendment protecting the subcontractor followed by a revision of our
lien law would seem desirable.
WILLIAM H. BOBBITT, JR.
Municipal Corporations-Tort Liability-Emergency Use of
Fire Department Inhalators
Traffic laws frequently exempt from their operation certain vehicles
engaged in public service emergencies 1 or give to such vehicles certain
rights of way over other vehicles on the streets and highways.2 Such
'IN. C. CoNsT. Art. X, §4.
"Cameron v. McDonald, 216 N. C. 712, 6 S. E. 2d 497 (1939) ; Broyhill v.
Gaither, 119 N. C. 443, 26 S. E. 31 (1896) ; Cumming v. Bloodworth, 87 N. C. 83
(1882).
' The subcontractor's lien for materials would likely be held to be inferior to
the constitutionally created homestead rights. However, it is submitted that this
would not solve the problem.
I E.g, N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-145 (Supp. 1951): "The speed limitations set
forth ... shall not apply to vehicles ...of the police in the chase or apprehen-
sion of violators of the law . . . nor to fire department or patrol vehicles when
traveling in response to a fire alarm, nor to ...ambulances when traveling in
emergencies, nor to vehicles... [of the] Utilities Commission when... regulating
and checking ... traffic and speed. . . .This provision shall not, however, protect
the driver of any such vehicle from the consequence of a reckless disregard of the
safety of others."
2IE.g., N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-156 (b) (1943): "The driver of a vehicle .
shall yield the right of way to police and fire department vehicles and public and
1951]
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special privileges do not, however, relieve the operator of such a vehicle
from the 'duty of exercising due care under the circumstances.
The application of such statutory special privileges was involved in
a recent New Mexico case.8 There a city employee, driving a city fire
truck in response to an emergency call for an inhalator, collided with
plaintiffs' automobile at an intersection. The facts as found by the
jury revealed that the plaintiffs, not having heard any warning, entered
the intersection slowly in response to a green light and were struck by
the fire truck, which, prior to applying its brakes fifty feet away, was
being driven fifty miles per hour against a red light. In an action for
damages, the court affirmed judgment against both defendant employee
and 'defendant city. The court held that a city fire truck responding to
a request for an inhalator was not "traveling in response to a fire alarm,"
nor was it an "ambulance" within the purview of a statute4 exempting
fire trucks and ambulances from speed limits when responding to fire
alarms and emergencies respectively. Neither was the fire truck being
operated upon "official business" within the meaning of a statute re-
quiring all vehicles to yield the right of way to police and fire department
vehicles when being operated "on official business and .. . sounding
audible signal." Therefore, the fire truck in responding to an emergency
call for an inhalator was not entitled to the special privileges granted
by the statutes.
No case has been found in which the North Carolina Supreme Court
has applied or interpreted sections 20-145 and 20-156 (b) of the General
Statutes.6 Furthermore, the principal case seems to be the first re-
corded decision in which a court has applied such statutes to a fire
department vehicle responding to an emergency call for an inhalator.
But in view of the increasingly extensive use of inhalators by the fire
departments of North Carolina, 7 an effort will be made to point out, in
the light of related decisions in this and other jurisdictions, the probable
alternatives open to the North Carolina courts if and when they are
confronted by the situation in the principal case.
private ambulances when the latter are operated upon official business and ...
sound audible signal .... This provision shall not operate to relieve the driver
... [of aforenamed vehicles] from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety
of all persons using the highways, nor shall it protect the driver . . .from 'the
consequence of any arbitrary exercise of such right of way."
'Tiedebohl v. Springer, 232 P. 2d 694 (N. M. 1951).
'N. M. STAT. ANN. §68-509 (1941). This statute is identical with the North
Carolina statute (see note 1 supa ) with the exception that no mention is made of
ambulances or utilities commission vehicles.
I N. M. STAT. ANN. §68-519 (1941). This statute is identical with the corre-
sponding North Carolina statute. See note 2 supra.
'See notes 1 and 2 supra.
' Eight out of ten fire departments interrogated are equipped with inhalators
which are available in emergency instances. The fire departments interrogated
are located in cities with a population of five to ten thousand.
[Vol. 30
1951] NOTES AND COMMENTS 91
One court has described statutes strikingly similar to those of North
Carolina as "the power of the Legislature to determine what is or is not
negligence under the circumstances."'8 In applying such statutes, the
courts of California and Maryland have held, in effect, that the operator
of an emergency vehicle is not required to use the same care that the
law requires of the ordinary motorist.9 As for the civil liability of the
employee driver, it is probable that the North Carolina Court would, in
the light of its connective 'decisions,10 hold him personally liable to one
injured by his negligent operation of the fire truck; however, in the
language of our statutes, there must be shown "an arbitrary exercise
of the right of way" and "a reckless disregard for the safety of others."'"
Furthermore, in North Carolina, in order to make a traffic violation the
basis of a recovery for damages, the act complained of, though negligence
per se, must have been the proximate cause of the injury.'
2
Apparently, the court in the principal case grounded the liability of
the city on a statute,13 but an attempt to impose a civil liability upon a
municipality in North Carolina under the circumstances of the principal
case would inevitably involve the issue of municipal tort immunity in
governmental functions.1 4  North Carolina is in accord with the weight
of authority in holding that the maintenance and operation of a fire
department is a governmental function, and that the municipality, in the
8 Lucus v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 476, 60 P. 2d 1011 (1936) ; rehearing
denied, 75 P. 2d 599, 601 (1938).
' Isaacs v. City and County of San Francisco, 73 Cal. App. 2d 621, 167 P. 2d 221
(1946) ("due regard" means that a driver should, by suitable warning, give others
a reasonable opportunity to yield right of way); Raynor v. City of Arcata, 11
Cal. 2d 113, 77 P. 2d 1054 (1938) ("arbitrary exercise" cannot be predicated upon
speed and failure to observe other rules of the road where warning has been
given); Baltimore Transit Co. v. Young, 189 Md. 428, 56 A. 2d 140 (1947) (or-
dinary care cannot be expected of one who is attempting to prevent public disaster).
" Lewis v. Hunter, 212 N. C. 504, 193 S. E. 814 (1937) (municipal employee
engaged in a governmental function held personally liable); Nissen v. City of
Winston-Salem, 206 N. C. 888, 175 S. E. 310 (1934) (municipal fireman held to
be an employee). See Note, 23 N. C. L. REV. 270 (1945).
11 See notes 1 and 2 supra.
1 Wallace v. Longest, 226 N. C. 161, 37 S. E. 2d 112 (1946) ; Hobbs v. Coach
Co., 225 N. C. 323, 34 S. E. 2d 211 (1945); Morgan v. Carolina Coach Co., 225
N. C. 668, 36 S. E. 2d 263 (1945); Tarrant v. Bottling Co., 221 N. C. 390, 20
S. E. 2d 565 (1942). In each of these cases the violation of traffic regulations
was involved, and in each case the court held that, although the violation of the
statute involved was negligence per se, such negligence was actionable only if it
was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
11 N. M. STAT. ANN. §14-1611 (1941) provides that a municipal corporation
shall be liable for any act or tort done by any member or officer of the municipal
corporation, when done by the authority of or in the execution of orders of the
municipal corporation.
" The liability of a municipality in tort depends upon whether the act complained
of is characterized as governmental or proprietary. If governmental, there is no
liability unless imposed by statute; if proprietary, the municipality may be held
liable. Miller v. Wilson, 222 N. C. 340, 23 S. E. 2d 42 (1942) ; Parks v. Prince-
town, 217 N. C. 361, 8 S. E. 2d 217 (1940) ; Hodges v. Charlotte, 214 N. C. 737,
200 S. E. 889 (1938).
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absence of statutes to the contrary, is, therefore, not liable for injury
caused by the negligent operation of its fire department vehicles. 1'
The courts of some jurisdictions have limited the rule of governmental
immunity to the actual going to and returning from a fire, holding the
municipality liable when the fire trucks are being used for other pur-
poses.16 Other jurisdictions, on the other hand, have been more liberal
in spreading the cloak of "tort immunity" with regard to the operation
of fire vehicles.1 7 Although it seems that the principal case is in full
accord with the strict view in defining a "governmental function," in the
light of Lewis v. Hunter& it seems probable that North Carolina would
give a broader construction to the term, "governmental function." In
Lewis v. Hunter the court refused to hold a municipality liable for in-
juries negligently inflicted by a city mechanic while operating a police
car for the purpose of testing the radio. The court held that such was
a governmental function.19 Surely, with this case as a precedent, the
court might readily hold that the transportation of an inhalator in re-
sponse to an emergency call is a governmental function, and that the
municipality is, therefore, not liable for the negligent operation of the
fire trucks by its employee.
Nevertheless, in responding to emergency calls for inhalators, North
Carolina municipalities should be cognizant of the fact that the extent
of the statutory "exemptions" and "prior rights" applicable to fire de-
partment vehicles is, as interpreted in other jurisdictions, necessarily
tetermined by the terms of the grant.20 North Carolina statutes exempt
"Klussette v. Liggett Drug Co., 227 N. C. 353, 42 S. E. 2d 411 (1947) ; Mabe
v. City of Winston-Salem, 190 N. C. 486, 130 S. E. 2d 169 (1925).
For the weight of authority see Notes, 9 A. L. R. 143 (1920), 33 A. L. R.
690 (1924), 110 A. L. R. 1119 (1937) (cases collected on fire department as per-
taining to the governmental or proprietary branch of a municipality).
" Opocensky v. South Omaha, 101 Neb. 336, 163 N. W. 325 (1917) (court held
city liable on the ground that testing a fire truck was not a governmental func-
tion) ; Johnson v. Omaha, 108 Neb. 841, 188 N. W. 122 (1922) (court held city
liable on the grounds that driving fire truck from repair shop to station was not
a governmental function) ; Blagay v. Chicago, 290 Ill. App. 598, 7 N. E. 2d 934
(1937) (court held city liable on the ground that hauling rocks into fire station
garden with fire truck was not a governmental function).
"T District of Columbia v. May, 68 F. 2d 755 (D. C. Cir. 1933), cert. denicd,
292 U. S. 630 (1933) (court held city not liable on ground that driving fire vehicle
to get equipment for fire box was a governmental function) ; Hooper v. Childress,
34 S. W. 2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) (negligently driving a truck on routine
drive and not in response to a fire call held a governmental function) ; Rollow v.
Ogden City, 66 Utah 475, 243 Pac. 791 (1926) (court held city not liable on
grounds that driving fire truck from substation to main station was a governmental
function).
"8212 N. C. 504, 193 S. E. 814 (1937).
11 Id. at 509, ". . . anything that he did for the city with the automobile in the
scope of his employment was done as an incident to the police power of the city-
a purely governmental function."
Schumacker v. City of Milwaukee, 209 Wis. 43, 243 N. W. 756 (1932)
. if such grant is general and unrestrictive, such vehicles are entitled to
assert their privileges at all times when in use for proper purposes) ; Audette v.
[Vol. 30
1951] NOTES AND COMMENTS 93
fire trucks from speed limits when "traveling in response to a fire
alarm" and give them the right of way when "operated upon official
business." Query: is the scope of these statutes broad enough to cover
fire vehicles responding to emergency calls for inhalators?
In the light of the foregoing comments it would appear that the
following possibilities would confront the North Carolina courts in de-
termining the liability of a municipality for injuries negligently inflicted
by a fire truck while responding to a call for an inhalator:
(1) A fire vehicle engaged in this function comes within the purview
of G. S. 20-145 or G. S. 20-156(b), 2 1 and (a) such an engage-
ment is a governmental function, thereby not subjecting the
municipality to tort liability, unless (b) the municipality is in-
sured against such liability in accordance with North Carolina
statutes.-
2 2
(2) A fire vehicle engaged in this function comes within the pur-
view of G. S. 20-145 or G. S. 20-156(b), but (a) such a func-
tion is not governmental, 23 and (b) the municipality is liable
for all injuries proximately resulting from the negligence of the
employee,24 notwithstanding the question of liability insurance.
(3) A fire vehicle engaged in this function does not come within
the purview of G. S. 20-145 or G. S. 20-156(b), and (a) such
a function is not governmental, and (b) the municipality is
liable for all injuries proximately resulting from the negligence
of the employee, notwithstanding the question of liability in-
surance.
Entirely apart from the issue of municipal liability, the stocking of
inhalators as a part of the emergency equipment of fire departments is
a development which should be recognized by courts as 'distinctly in the
New England Transp. Co., 71 R. I. 420, 46 A2d 570 (1946) ("... when the grant
is limited in terms, it must be so construed.").
"' It seems clear that a fire department vehicle delivering an inhalator is not
"traveling in response to a fire alarm" under G. S. 20-145. Neither does it seem
correct to designate such a vehicle an "ambulance" under G. S. 20-145. It would
seem correct to say that a fire department vehicle delivering an inhalator is "oper-
ated upon official business," under G. S. 20-156(b).
2'N. C. GEN. STAT. §§160-191.1 through 160-191.5 (Supp. 1951). These statutes,
enacted by the 1951 Legislature, provide that a municipality may, by properly in-
suring itself, waive its immunity from tort liability for the negligent operation of
its motor vehicles in governmental functions. Such waiver would be effective only
to the extent of the liability insurance in force. See Note, 29 N. C. L. REv. 421
(1951).
"' See note 21 supra. Would not "official business" cover both governmental
and proprietary functions? If so, it could be reasoned that the special exemption
of G. S. 20-156(b) would apply even though the function is proprietary rather than
governmental.
"And under G. S. 20-156(b) it would be necessary to find an "arbitrary
exercise of ... right of way" in order to recover from either the individual or the
municipality.
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public interest. That there may also be a corresponding public interest,
perhaps even greater, in holding a municipality liable for the negligence
of its employees is merely to emphasize some of the undesirable conse-
quences of the traditional "municipal tort immunity idea." There is
good argument for the complete abolition of the "municipal tort im-
munity rule" so that a municipality would be subject to liability just as
any private employer.2 5 Abolition of this rule in North Carolina would
not subject a municipality to liability for the negligent operation of its
public service vehicles without regard to the emergency circumstances,
as there would still remain the ordinary application of statutory priv-
ileges to ascertain what standard of care a municipal employee is to be
held to in a given situation.
WILLIS D. BROWN.
Taxation-Gifts in Trust for Minors-Annual Exclusions
Section 1003 (b) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that
"In the case of gifts (other than gifts of future interests in property)
made to any person by the donor during the calendar year 1943 and
subsequent calendar years, the first $3,000 of such gifts to such person
shall not, for the purposes of subsection (a), be included in the total
amount of gifts made during such year."'
In determining what is a future interest within the meaning of sec-
tion 1003 (b) (3), primary emphasis is placed upon the "use, possession
and enjoyment" of the property rather than upon the vesting of the
property in the donee.2 The Regulations3 stipulate that "'Future in-
terests' is a legal term, and includes reversions, remainders, and other
interests or estates whether vested or contingent, and whether or not
2 Municipal tort immunity is an old subject of sharp attack. Green, Municipal
Liability for Tort, 38 ILm. L. REv. 126 (1944) ; Hobbs, The Tort Liability of
Municipalities, 27 VA. L. REV. 126 (1940) ; Warp, Can the "King" Do No Wrong?,
31 NAT. MUNIc. REv. 311 (1942) ; Notes, 14 N. C. L. Ry. 388 (1936), 22 N. Y.
U. L. Q. Rxv. 509 (1947), 24 VA. L. Rv. 86 (1937).
At least eight states (Cal., Ill., N. M., N. Y., Pa., S. C., W. Va., Wis.) im-
pose, by statute, civil liability upon municipalities for the negligent operation of
their motor vehicles in governmental functions.
Florida imposes liability on the municipality on the ground that reckless opera-
tion of its vehicles upon the streets constitutes a nuisance.
1 INT. REV. CODE §1003 (a) provides "The term 'net gifts' means the total
amount of gifts made during the calendar year, less the deductions provided in
section 1004."
'Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U. S. 18 (1945) ; United States v. Pelzer, 312
U. S. 399 (1941) ; Commissioner v. Glos, 123 F. 2d 548 (7th Cir. 1941).
U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, §86.11. This regulation further provides that "The
term has no reference to such contractual rights as exist in a bond, note (though
bearing no interest until maturity), or in a policy of life insurance, the obligations
of which are to be discharged by payments in the future. But a future interest
or interests in such contractual obligations may be created by the limitations con-
tained in a trust or other instrument of transfer employed in effecting the gift."
[Vol. ,s0
